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Original Intent in the First Congress
Louis J. Sirico, Jr. I
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Arguing Original Intent in Legislative Debate
A significant body of literature has examined how the Framers and rati-
fiers of the Constitution 2 subsequently viewed the role of original intent in
construing the Constitution. The primary focus of these works is how those
views should influence today's courts in deciding controversies.3 A less de-
veloped question, however, is how members of the First Congress employed
originalist constitutional arguments in making and debating proposed stat-
utes.4 This study seeks to contribute to that exploration, not by discussing
what the Founders believed about using originalist arguments, but by examin-
ing the record of the First Federalist Congress to determine what originalist
arguments its members actually made.
5
1. Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
2. This article follows the convention of referring to the delegates to the Consti-
tutional Convention as the Framers, the members of the state ratifying conventions as
the ratifiers, and the leaders of that era as the Founders. At the close of the Constitu-
tional Convention, the framers forwarded the proposed Constitution to the Articles of
Confederation Congress meeting in New York City. The Congress forwarded the
proposal to the states which assembled state ratification conventions pursuant to Arti-
cle VII of the proposed Constitution. Once nine states ratified, the Confederation
Congress took steps to elect the first Federal Congress and select a President. For a
history of the ratification, see RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION (Michael Allen Gillespie
& Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). For a documentary history, see THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jensen et al. eds.,
1976-1995) [hereinafter DHRC].
3. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
15-28 (2d ed. 2002); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE ch. 23, at 618-80 (2d ed. 1999);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47-70 (3d ed. 2000) (sum-
marizing the debate on this issue).
4. The leading articles are Hans W. Baade, Original Intention: Raoul Berger's
Fake Antique, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1523 (1992); Raoul Berger, Original Intention in His-
torical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Charles A. Lofgren, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985).
5. Analytical narratives of the First Congress include CHARLENE BANGS
BICKFORD & KENNETH BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS, 1789-1791 (1989) (offering a very accessible narrative); DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801
1
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An examination of the Founders' contemporary influences yields a
somewhat surprising revelation: members of the First Congress discussing
original intent. In the British and Commonwealth tradition, courts do not con-
sider legislative history when construing statutes.6 This principle ruled in the
United States until at least the latter half of the nineteenth century. 7 Another
contemporary influence rejecting reliance on originalist arguments may have
been the anti-interpretive tradition in American Protestantism, which was
designed to reject questionable interpretations of scripture by relying solely
on the words of the text.8 Thus, it is not surprising that at the First Congress,
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts relied on William Blackstone's Commentar-
ies on the Laws of England for rules on interpreting the Constitution:
The Judge [Blackstone] observes "[t]hat the fairest and most ra-
tional method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring
his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the
most probable, and these signs are either the words, the context,
the subject matter, the effect and consequences, or the spirit and
reason of the law." With respect to words, the Judge observes that
"they are generally understood in their usual and most ordinary
signification, not so much regarding the grammar as their general
and popular use."
9
However, reliance on legislative intent was acceptable in an earlier era.
In the words of one historian:
It is only after the middle of the fourteenth century, when judges
find themselves no longer able to draw either upon the actual inten-
tion of the legislator or upon the royal dispensing power, that they
are forced to construct a body of rules of statutory interpretation: a
(1997) (providing a narrative account focusing on the constitutional issues that arose
in debates on the major issues); JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999) (providing a narrative of
deliberations over constitutional issues framed as a debate among members of first
Congresses). For a narrative of elections to the First Congress and biographies of its
members, see MARGARET C. S. CHRISTMAN, THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
1791 (1989). Biographies also appear in XIV DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS, March 4, 1789-March 3, 1791, at 489-932 (Linda Grant DePauw
et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter DHFFC].
6. See Baade, supra note 4, at 1524-25; Powell, supra note 4, at 894-903.
7. See Baade, supra note 4, at 1527-28.
8. See Powell, supra note 4, at 889-94.
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document, and no longer the verbal explanations of one man to an-
other, becomes the sole basis for the judge's action .... 10
Just as the judges of the early fourteenth century could draw on the
memories of lawmakers, delegates to the First Congress could draw on the
memories of several drafters of the Constitution and numerous members of
the state ratifying conventions. The First Congress convened almost immedi-
ately after the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventi"ns.
At least twenty-eight members of the House and fourteen members of the
Senate had been delegates to their respective state ratifying conventions.'
2
Nine delegates to the Constitutional Convention served in the House and
eleven served in the Senate.' 3 Thus, Congress had easy access to sources of
information about the intent of the Founders. Moreover, Congress was a leg-
islature and, unlike courts, was not required to adhere to rules that prohibited
looking beyond the text and rules of statutory construction when interpreting
a constitution. Interestingly, in these records, I find no suggestion that the
10. Samuel E. Thome, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon 's Case, 31 Nw. U. L.
REV. 202, 207 (1936).
11. The Constitutional Convention concluded on September 17, 1787. See JAMES
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 659 (1966)
[hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES]. The House of Representatives reached a quorum on
April 1, 1789. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xvi. By that time, only North Carolina
and Rhode Island had yet to ratify the Constitution. See infra notes 17-19 and accom-
panying text.
12. Members of the House who had served in their respective state ratifying
conventions include Roger Sherman (Conn.), see XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 507-
08; Jeremiah Wadsworth (Conn.), id. at 520-21; George Matthews (Ga.), id. at 562;
George Gale (Md.), id. at 586; Michael Jenifer Stone (Md.), id. at 598; Fisher Ames
(Mass.), id. at 615; Jonathan Grout (Mass.), id. at 628; George Partridge (Mass.), id.
at 633; Theodore Sedgwick (Mass.), id. at 637; Samuel Livermore (N.H.), id. at 666;
Jeremiah Van Rensselaer (N.Y.), id. at 726; John Baptista Ashe (N.C.), id. at 739;
Timothy Bloodworth (N.C.), see id. at 742; John Sevier (N.C.), id. at 746; John Steele
(N.C.), id. at 748; Hugh Williamson (N.C.) id. at 753; Thomas Hartley (Pa.), id. at
784; Frederick Augustus Muhlenburg (Pa.), id. at 793; Thomas Scott (Pa.), id. at 802;
Henry Wynkoop (Pa.), id. at 808; Benjamin Bourn (R.I.), id. at 820; Aedanus Burke
(S.C.), id. at 837; Thomas Sumter (S.C.), id. at 853; Theodorick Bland (Va.), id. at
884; Isaac Coles (Va.), id. at 894; Richard Bland Lee (Va.), id. at 901; James Madison
(Va.), see id. at 907; and Alexander White (Va.), id. at 928.
Members of the Senate who served in their respective state ratifying conven-
tions were Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.), id. at 493; William Samuel Johnson (Conn.), id.
at 499; Richard Bassett (DE), id. at 529; William Few (Ga.), see id. at 542; Caleb
Strong (Mass,), id. at 611; John Langdon (N.H.), id. at 650-5 1; Rufus King (N.Y.), id.
at 701-02; Philip John Schuyler (N.Y.), see id. at 706; Benjamin Hawkins (N.C.), id.
at 731; Samuel Johnston (N.C.), id. at 736; Theodore Foster (R.I.), id. at 814; Joseph
Stanton (R.I.), id. at 818; William Grayson (Va.), id. at 867; and James Monroe, see
id. at 877-78.
13. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 12.
2006]
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rules of construction should be any different for a constitution than for a stat-
ute. Nonetheless, many years had passed since the fourteenth century, and
members of Congress were unfamiliar with a tradition that would permit
them to inquire into intent. However, as this study shows, the Founders were
sometimes willing to make arguments that look beyond the text.
For example, in contrast to Blackstone and Gerry, James Madison pos-
ited a more innovative and expansive set of rules of construction:
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the gov-
ernment cannot be just.
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may
be, are to be admitted - where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its
consequences.
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument,
if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.
Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evi-
dence of the meaning of the parties.
In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the de-
gree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be regarded,
but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the
probability or improbability if its being left to construction.
14
Nevertheless, throughout his life and with only a few deviations, Madison
would consider evidence from the state ratifying conventions, but not the
Constitutional Convention, because he regarded the Convention as only a
drafting committee.'
5
14. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 369. Gerry's explication of Blackstone was a
response to Madison's canons. Late in life, Madison wrote that the most pertinent
considerations in constitutional interpretation should be:
1. The evils and defects for curing which the Constitution was called for
& introduced.
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted.
3. The early, deliberate & continued practice under the Constitution, as
preferable to constructions adopted on the spur of occasions, and subject
to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.
Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 267, 291 (1997) (quoting Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May
1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370, 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)).
15. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 362-65 (1996); Donald 0. Dewey, James Madison
Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 45-47 (1971) (dis-
cussing Madison's reasons for discounting the proceedings of the Convention). Im-
[Vol. 71
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Courts and legislatures overlap with regard to how they employ the
Constitution. Just as a court seeks to determine whether a statute is constitu-
tionally permissible, a legislature seeks to enact statutes that will pass consti-
tutional muster. However, a legislature also employs the Constitution for
another function: to enact statutes that help further the purposes of the Consti-
tution or at least harmonize with those purposes. With respect to originalism,
a legislature consults the Founders to define the contours of the Constitution
and identify its purposes.
This study examines the arguments that members of the First Congress
made with respect to original intent. It identifies and classifies these argu-
ments in categories analogous to those that might be used in cataloguing ar-
guments based on canons of statutory construction. Given the overlapping
functions of constitutional argument for courts and legislatures, the analogy
should be unsurprising.
Perhaps the study's most significant finding is that members of the First
Congress invoked originalist arguments a number of times. On a given issue,
however, these arguments were positioned among many other arguments and
were not necessarily the dispositive ones. As this study illustrates, they usu-
ally tended to deal with general policies underlying the Constitution rather
than with specific words that the Constitution contained.
mediately before declaring his canons of construction, Madison was. speaking against
establishing a national bank and arguing that Congress lacked the constitutional au-
thority to enact the legislation. When making his argument, Madison referred to the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention: "[h]is impression might perhaps be the
stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of incorporation
had been proposed in the general convention and rejected." XIV DHFFC, supra note
5, at 368. His recollection of the Convention proceedings was accurate. See
MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 11, at 638-39. At the Congress, Madison arguably
relied on the intent of the Convention in debates over compensation for members of
Congress, and over the national government's assumption of state debt. See infra text
accompanying notes 82 & 90. Madison's general refusal to rely on the proceedings of
the Convention is consistent with his refusal to publish his notes on the Convention's
proceedings-our primary source of information on those proceedings during his life-
time. See DREW R. McCoy, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 163-64 (1989) (discussing Madison's reasons for not permitting
an earlier publication). For more information on Madison's theory of constitutional
interpretation, see Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitu-
tion, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1997); Dewey, supra.
At the same time, Madison endorsed reliance on the proceedings of the state
ratifying conventions. However, Jonathan Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitu-
tion, the first publication to provide widely accessible accounts of the conventions,
was not published until 1936, the year of Madison's death. See Dewey, supra, at 41.
And, as to be expected, the sentiments of the various conventions were often at vari-
ance with one another. See id. at 41-42.
2006]
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B. The First Congress and Its Documentary Record
The First Congress met in three sessions: from March 4 until September
29, 1789; from January 4 until August 12, 1790; and from December 6 until
March 3, 1791.16 The first two sessions took place in New York City and the
third was in Philadelphia.' 7 The Federalists dominated the new Congress,
initially holding forty-nine of fifty-nine seats in the House and twenty of
twenty-two seats in the Senate.' 8 At the onset of the first session, North Caro-
lina and Rhode Island had yet to ratify the Constitution and thus enjoyed no
representation. On November 21, 1789, on its second attempt, North Carolina
ratified the Constitution and sent two Federalist senators, three Federalist
representatives, and two Antifederalist representatives to the second session
of Congress. 19 After encountering significant economic pressure,20 Rhode
Island ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790 and sent a Federalist and an
Antifederalist to the Senate and a Federalist to the House who served in the
third congressional session.
2 1
Because we have only limited accounts of the First Congress, this study
is necessarily limited to the floor debates in the House of Representatives.
Until 1795, 2 the Senate followed the tradition of the Constitutional Conven-
tion,23 the Articles of Confederation Congress,24 and the British Parliament
(until the mid 1770s) 25 of meeting behind closed doors. As a result, our re-
cord of its proceedings consist primarily of the Senate Legislative Journal, the
16. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at v.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. See CHRISTMAN, supra note 4, at 86-89 (describing North Carolina's ratifica-
tion and the ensuing selection of senators and representatives: Federalist Senators
Samuel Johnston and Benjamin Hawkins, Federalist representatives Hugh William-
son, John Steele, and John Sevier, and Antifederalist representatives John Baptista
Ashe and Timothy Bloodworth).
20. The federal government subjected goods produced in Rhode Island to cus-
toms duties as if they were imported from a foreign country and then enacted legisla-
tion that would impose a ban on all commercial trade between Rhode Island and the
United States and require Rhode Island to pay $27,000 as its cost of discharging fed-
eral obligations incurred prior to the effective date of the Constitution. See CURRIE,
supra note 5, at 97-98.
21. See CHRISTMAN, supra note 5, at 90-94 (describing Rhode Island's ratifica-
tion and selection of Federalist Senator Theodore Foster, Antifederalist Senator Jo-
seph Stanton, Jr., and Federalist representative Benjamin Bourn).
22. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xv-xvi.
23. See id. at xv.
24. Id.
25. The process of disclosure of the proceedings in the popular press was a grad-
ual one with the House of Commons fully acquiescing in 1772 and the House of
Lords fully acquiescing in 1775. Id. at xiv.
(Vol. 71
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Senate Executive Journal, 26 and the extant notes and diaries of some sena-
tors,27 none of which provide an account of floor debates helpful to this study.
For deliberations in the House, however, a considerable record is avail-
able. Until recently, the standard source was Gale and Seaton's Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (also known as the. Annals
28of Congress). Its volumes covering the First Congress were not published
until 1834 and consisted of reports taken from Thomas Lloyd's Congres-
sional Register and John Fenno's Gazette of the United States,29 both con-
temporaneous records that were privately printed. However, in recent years,
scholars have benefited from the publication of the multi-volumed series
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-91,' ° which com-
piles all extant records of that congress, including the Congressional Register,
the Gazette of the United States, Thomas Lloyd's unpublished shorthand
notes,31 articles appearing in two newspapers, The [New York] Daily Adver-
tiser, and The New-York Daily Gazette, as well as other available partial ac-
counts of the proceedings. Although the records include the errors and incon-
sistencies inherent in virtually any reportage, 32 they offer a tremendous re-
source for those interested in the nation's founding.
26. See I DHFFC, supra note 5 (reproducing the Senate Legislative Journal); II
DHFFC at 3-34 (reproducing the Senate Executive Journal). Article I, section 5,
clause 3 of the Constitution provides: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings, and from time to time publish the same ... ." However, this provision was
not construed to require publishing floor debates. See CURIUE, supra note 5, at 10.
27. The lengthiest and most detailed diary is that of William Maclay of Penn-
sylvania. See IX DHFFC, supra note 5, at 3-401. Maclay apparently was a difficult
individual whose personality distorted his account. See id. at xi-xii.
28. 1 & 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
(Joseph Gales, Jr. & William W. Seaton eds., 1834). With the exception of one speech
from another source, these volumes include only the contents of the Congressional
Register and the Gazette of the United States. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xxvii.
For a history of the efforts of Gale and Seaton, see id. at xxiii-xxvii.
29. Fenno's Gazette of the United States published accounts of the debates of the
First Congress beginning on April 15, 1789. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xxxv.
For a history of Fenno's efforts, see id. at xxxiv-xxxviii.
30. The House debates of the First Congress appear in volumes X through XIV;
the Journal of the House of Representatives appears in volume III. See DHFFC, supra
note 5. 1 have enormous respect and sympathy for the generations of historians who
studied the First Congress by squinting at microfiche or at crumbling pages of tiny
print for hours on end.
31. Lloyd's shorthand notes contain records that never saw publication in the
short-lived Congressional Register. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xxxiii.
32. Later in life, Madison complained that Lloyd's notes were "very defective,
and abound in errors, some of them very gross, where the speeches were not revised
by the author." See id. at xxvi-xxvii.
2006]
7
Sirico: Sirico: Original Intent
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
C. Methodology
This study examines the debates in the House of Representatives for in-
stances in which members based their arguments on the intent of the Foun-
ders. The study classifies the arguments in five rhetorical categories.
33
1. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Founders' Intent Ex-
pressed at the State Ratifying Conventions.
2. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention.
3. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Evils that the Constitu-
tional Convention Sought to Avoid.
4. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation.
5. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Publications Widely Circu-
lated during the Constitution's Ratification.
The study then refines some categories into a number of subcategories,
with most subcategories offering only a few examples. The variety of sub-
categories and the limited number of examples for each suggest that no one
method of argument was singularly effective with respect to the various top-
ics of debate.
Two issues of methodology deserve attention: the definition of "original
intent" and the difficulty of determining which speaker arguments to include
in the study. Depending on the context, the definition of "original intent"
could range from the decisions and purposes of the Framers in selecting the
words of the Constitution, to the meanings of the Constitution's words, or to
the "impressions and interpretations of the Constitution formed by its original
readers, citizens, polemicists, and convention delegates who participated in
one way or another in ratification., 34 This study takes a relatively narrow
view; it includes only arguments in which a House member made a reference
to the Constitution's legislative history (broadly construed) when arguing that
(1) a proposal was or was not constitutional or (2) the legislative history was
relevant to the proposal's merits. A broader view would risk including a large
33. In selecting these categories, I have relied heavily on CHESTER J. ANTIEU,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1982), which necessarily draws on the traditional
canons of statutory construction. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION (6th ed. 2002) (the leading treatise on statutory construction).
34. RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 8. I borrow my description of the range of the
possible definitions of "original intent" from Professor Rakove who distinguishes
between "intent," "meaning," and "understanding." See id. at 7-9.
[Vol. 71
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number of arguments whose connection with originalism is quite tenuous.
Even with this narrow definition of intent, determining which arguments to
classify as originalist requires making difficult choices.
The following three examples illustrate the methodology of the study
and how it addresses the close cases.
First Example: In a debate over whether to give the President the power
to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from office, 35 Abraham Baldwin
of Georgia argued that such a delegation of authority would mix the powers
of the President and Senate, thus violating the principle of separation of pow-
ers. He noted that the Constitution requires the President to receive the advice
and consent of the Senate in making such an appointment, but does not re-
quire such a concurrence in order to remove an officer.36 Baldwin argued that
"[t]he senate must concur with the president in making appointments, but
with respect to the removal they are not associated; no such clause is in the
constitution; and therefore I should conclude, that the convention did not
chuse they should have the power." 31 Although Baldwin invoked only the
Framers' implied intent, the reliance on intent is strong enough to merit in-
cluding the argument in this study.
Second Example: One debate considered whether to amend the Constitu-
tion so that after the first census and until the size of the House reached one
hundred members, there should be one representative for every thirty thou-
sand citizens. After the House reached one hundred members, the number of
representatives should be not be less than one hundred or more than one hun-
dred seventy five, with each state having at least one representative.38 The
Constitution states that after the first census, "The Number of Representatives
shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at
Least one Representative. . .. 39 Some House members were concerned that
the potential size of the body would be unmanageably large or undemocrati-
cally too small, and in the course of the debate, some members proposed
amendments to reduce or increase the potential size by various methods.40
35. For a summary of this debate, see CURRIE, supra note 5, at 36-41.
36. "[Ajnd he shall nominate, and by and with the [aidvice and [c]onsent of the
Senate, shall appoint [a]mbassadors, other public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls, [j]udges
of the [S]upreme [C]ourt, and all other [o]fficers of the United States, whose
[a]ppointments are not herein otherwise provided for." U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
37. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1005.
38. Id. at 1242-53 (recording the debate).
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
40. John Vining of Delaware unsuccessfully proposed "that where the number of
inhabitants of any particular state amounts to 45,000, they shall be entitled to two
representatives." XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1243. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts
unsuccessfully proposed that after the first census, there should be one representative
for every 40,000 until the number reached 100. Id. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachu-
setts successfully moved to increase the ultimate size of the House to 200. Id. at 1249.
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire unsuccessfully moved to increase the mini-
2006]
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Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, explained that the proposed Constitution initially required a ratio
of one representative to forty thousand citizens, but that the ratio was reduced
when George Washington requested the lesser ratio "as more favorable to the
public interest.
'A
Although Sherman's statement refers to proceedings at the Constitu-
tional Convention, it is not part of an argument that a proposal before the
Congress is or is not constitutional. Moreover, his statement is not suffi-
ciently relevant to the merits of the proposal under consideration. Therefore,
the statement is not part of this study.
Third Example: In a debate on a proposal to pay the senators a salary of
six dollars per day and members of the House five dollars per day,42 James
Madison argued in favor of the proposition:
[H]e observed, that it had been evidently contemplated by the con-
stitution, to distinguish in favor of the senate, that men of abilities
and firm principles, whom the love and custom of a retired life
might render averse to the fatigues of a public one, may be induced
to devote the experience of years, and the acquisitions of study, to
the service of their country.43
Although the study includes Madison's argument, it excludes this state-
ment by Joshua Seney of Maryland: "[g]entlemen have brought forward the
constitution upon this occasion, but I conceive it to be opposed to the very
principle that they mean to advocate. This will destroy the independence of
the several branches, which is to be strictly observed.""
The decision to include Madison's statement was a close one, because
Madison's reference to the Framers' intent was quite indirect. However, the
decision to exclude Seney's statement was not difficult, because Seney re-
ferred only to very general principles underlying the Constitution.
mum size of the House to 200. Id. at 1252. The initial motion, as amended by Sedg-
wick's motion, passed with 27 members for and 20 against. Id. at. 1254.
41. Id. at 1249. Sherman's recollection was largely accurate. Washington en-
dorsed a proposal by Nathaniel Gorham to this effect, and the Convention agreed to it
unanimously. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 11, at 655. However, Madison, who
unlike Sherman, supported a larger House, was critical of Sherman's reference to the
Constitutional Convention: "[He] [h]oped gentlemen would not be influenced by what
had been related to have passed in the convention; he expected the committee would
determine upon their own sense of propriety." XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1250.
Madison's criticism was consistent with his rejection of looking to the Convention
proceedings in matters of construction. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
42. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1136-39 (recording the debate).
43. Id. at 1152.
44. Id. at 1154.
[Vol. 71
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss3/3
ORIGINAL INTENT
Because the statements of the members of the House are often unclear in
explaining the extent to which they rely on the Founders' intent, if at all,
some decisions on what to include in the study may generate points of dis-
agreement. Moreover, it is true that some references to the Framers and ratifi-
ers may refer not to their intentions but to arguments based on the Constitu-
tion's language and structure.45 The lines of demarcation are often unclear. At
the same time, with so many representatives having served in the Articles of
Confederation Congress, the Constitutional Convention, and the state ratify-
ing conventions, members of the House must have engaged in informal con-
versations that informed them about the intent of participants in the Constitu-
tion's legislative history. Thus, the recorded speeches must be read in light of
what the representatives must have known.
The remainder of this article examines the First Congress's originalist
arguments. As previously mentioned, there are four categories of arguments,
often with subcategories in each. Since originalist arguments are attempts to
give effect to the Constitution's text, the article includes the relevant constitu-
tional provisions to give context to the arguments.
II. ORIGINAL INTENT ARGUMENTS
1.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Founders 'Intent
Expressed at the State Ratifying Conventions
Of the arguments based on original intent, those relying on statements at
the state ratifying conventions would seem the most persuasive. The conven-
tions were an essential part of the legislating process and, in fact, the final
step.
In the First Congress, delegates relied on the ratifying conventions in
debating four topics: the President's power to remove the head of an execu-
tive department, the House's authority to participate in structuring treaty ne-
gotiations, the establishment of a national bank, where to place amendments
in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, and assuming
the debts of the states.
45. See Powell, supra note 3, at 948 (stating that at the time, a reference to
"original intent" "referred to the 'intentions' of the sovereign parties to the constitu-
tional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution's language and discerned through
structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions of the
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1.01. Follow Policy Sentiments Expressed at the State Ratifying
Conventions
A. Removing the Head of an Executive Department
A major controversy in the First Congress was whether the President
had the power to remove a federal officer. According to two historians, "The
resolution forced Congress to confront and define basic tenets of constitu-
tional interpretation relating to the meaning of separation of powers, advice
and consent, checks and balances, and impeachment." 46 A number of consti-
tutional provisions are relevant to this debate.
Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides: "The President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Article I, section 3, clause 6 gives the Sen-
ate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments." No other provisions deal with
removing federal officers. Article II, section 2, paragraph 2 states that the
President shall "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ...
and all other Officers of the United States." Article I, section 8, clause 18,
authorizes Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof."
In May, 1789, James Madison (Va.) proposed establishing a department
of foreign affairs, to be headed by the secretary of the department of foreign
affairs. This secretary would be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, but could be removed only by the President.47 The
First Congress debated the constitutionality of permitting the President to
remove the officer without the concurrence of the Senate.
Arguing against the proposal, Elbridge Gerry (Mass.) rejected the con-
tention that Madison's proposal could find authorization under the "necessary
and proper clause" unless the clause was construed in an extraordinarily
broad manner:
By this very act the house are assuming a power to alter the consti-
tution.... Such a power would render the most important clause in
46. BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 38. For summaries of the debate, see id. at 38-41;
CURRIE, supra note 5, at 36-41; LYNCH, supra note 5, at 54-63. After a lengthy de-
bate, the house indirectly voted to give the President the power of removal. See XI
DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1043. The Senate, however, was evenly divided, requiring
Vice President Adams to cast the deciding vote approving the removal power. See I
DHFFC, supra note 5, at 86.
47. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at 725.
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the constitution [presumably Article II, section 2, clause 18] nuga-
tory, and one without which, I will be bold to say, this system of
government would never have been ratified.48
Also speaking in opposition to the proposal, Alexander White (Va.) ar-
gued that the Constitution should be strictly construed and not be read liber-
ally to give excessive power to the President. In support of this position, he
relied on Virginia's statement of ratification, which contained numerous pro-
posals for amendments, including ones that would limit federal power:
I will only remark that the state of North-Carolina has expressed
nearly the same sentiments as Virginia, with this difference, that
Carolina would not adopt the constitution till it was satisfied of this
principle, that we could not by constructive acts enlarge our pow-
ers, in order at a future day to destroy the state governments, and
with them the liberties of the people.
49
Not all delegates shared the concerns of Gerry and White. Elias
Boudinot (N.J.) supported the proposal on removal and referred to the senti-
ment expressed in the ratification conventions that the Constitution failed to
provide for a sufficient separation of powers. He argued that relying on the
legislative impeachment process for removal would amount to a "further
blending of the executive and legislative powers" contrary to the principle of
separation.
5 0
James Jackson (Ga.), who opposed the proposal, saw no such difficulty
in blending legislative and executive powers by relying on the impeachment
process. In support of his position, he cited James Wilson at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention: "[t]he celebrated Mr. Wilson agrees with me in this
sentiment, for he declares that the senate was constituted a check upon the
president. Let gentlemen turn over his speeches, delivered in the convention
of Pennsylvania, and they will find he asserts it as an incontrovertible fact." 5'
B. Appointing Commissioners to Negotiate Indian Treaties
In August 1789, the House considered a proposal for negotiating treaties
with Indian tribes and appointing no more than three commissioners to serve
as negotiators. One issue was whether the clause limiting the number of
48. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 930. For a report of the same speech employing
different wording, see id. at 902.
49. Id. at 941-42.
50. Id. at 966.
51. Id. at 1002-03.
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commissioners unconstitutionally interfered with the management of treaties
by the President and Senate. 2
Article II, section 2, paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides: "[The
President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present con-
cur .... ,
William Smith (Md. or S.C.) argued that the House lacked authority to
play a role in the matter: "I know it has been debated in some of the state
conventions, whether it is proper to let the president and senate have this
power, some have thought the president ought to have it exclusively, others
have judged it most eligible that the senate is associated with him, but I never
heard that any one thought the legislature should have concurrent jurisdiction
with them...."53
C. Establishing a National Bank
A vigorously debated issue in the First Congress was the establishment
of a national bank. 54 However, the delegates disagreed over whether the Con-
stitution authorized Congress to create such a powerful institution.
Article I, section 8, Paragraph 18 authorizes Congress to "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." James Madi-
son (Va.) argued that the "necessary and proper clause" was not broad
enough to authorize establishing a national bank, and that it "gave no addi-
tional powers to those enumerated.",55 In support of his position, he read
"sundry passages from the debates of the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North-
Carolina conventions, shewing the grounds on which the constitution had
been vindicated by its principle advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its
powers, charged on it by its opponents."
56
52. See id. at 1192-1200 (reporting the debate on this issue, which ended with
the House striking the provision on the number of permissible commissioners).
53. Id. at 1195-96.
54. For summaries of the debate on the successful proposal, see BICKFORD, su-
pra note 5, at 73-75; CURRIE, supra note 5, at 78-80; LYNCH, supra note 5, at 77-90.
55. XIV DHFFC, supra note , at 374. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 73 ("His
opponents considered the argument merely a smokescreen for his real interests .... ")
Southerners like Madison feared that because the bank would be located in Philadel-
phia, the bill would make that city both the financial and political capital of the coun-
try. Id. They also believed that a national bank would become a banking monopoly
that would benefit northern merchants. See LYNCH, supra note 5, at 78.
56. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 374.
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Further, Madison argued that "[t]he explanatory declarations and
amendments accompanying the ratifications of the several states formed a
striking evidence, wearing the same complexion."
57
1.02. Follow the Policy Sentiments Expressed at the State Ratifying
Conventions with Great Caution
A. Establishing a National Bank
In the ongoing debate over a national bank, delegates employed a num-
ber of arguments. In disagreeing with Madison's reliance on state ratifying
conventions, Elbridge Gerry (Mass.), discounted the records of the state con-
ventions. He noted that "the debates of the state conventions, as published by
the short-hand writers, were generally partial and mutilated.", 8 Moreover,
these records were sometimes one-sided, omitting the arguments of the Anti-
federalists. In addition to being one sided, the speeches of a few participants
may not express the sense of an entire convention. Furthermore, given the
underlying struggle between the Federalists and Antifederalists, participants
could be induced "to depart from candor, and to call in the aid of art, flattery,
professions of friendship, promises of office, and even food cheer." as well
as make threats of political death to those who disagreed.
1.03. Follow the Specific Wishes Expressed at the State Ratifying
Conventions on Specific Issues
A. Interweaving Amendments to the Constitution Within the Constitu-
tion or Appending them as a Supplement
In the debates over drafting amendments to the Constitution, a dispute
erupted over whether the amendments should be interwoven into the body of
the document or added as a supplement.
60
Article V sets out procedures for amending the Constitution and pro-
vides that when the procedures are satisfied, the amendments "shall be valid
for all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution." William L. Smith
(S.C.) argued in favor of incorporating the amendments. He "[r]ead extracts
from the amendments proposed by several of the state conventions at the time
they ratified the constitution, from which he said it appeared that they were
generally of the opinion that the phraseology of the constitution ought to be
altered; nor would this mode of proceeding repeal any part of the constitution
57. Id. at 375.
58. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 460.
59. See XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 460.
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but such as it touched, the remainder will be in force during the time of con-
sidering it and ever after."
61
B. Drafting the Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." In the debates
over its drafting, Antifederalist Thomas Tucker (Va.) unsuccessfully moved
"to add the word 'expressly' so as to read 'The powers not expressly dele-
gated by this constitution.' 62 The proposal was designed to narrow the au-
thority of the national government by denying the government any powers by
implication. In opposing Tucker's motion, James Madison stated "he remem-
bered the word 'expressly' had been moved in the convention of Virginia, by
the opponents to the ratification, and after full and fair discussion was given
up by them, and the system allowed to retain its present form."
63
C. Abolishing Slavery
In Spring 1790, Quakers petitioned Congress to forbid vessels employed
in the international slave trade from using ports in Pennsylvania. 64 In debating
the petition, delegates to the First Congress considered whether Article I sec-
tion 9 prohibited the Quaker's proposal.
Article I, section 9, clause 1 of the Constitution forbids Congress from
prohibiting "The Migration and Importation of [slaves] ... prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . ." While debating this measure,
William L. Smith (S.C.) argued that the southern states would never have
ratified the Constitution if it did not offer protection to slavery. "On entering
into this government, [the southern states] apprehended that the other states
not knowing the necessity the citizens of the southern states were under to
hold this species of property, would, from motives of humanity and benevo-
lence, be led to vote for a general emancipation; and had they not seen, that
61. Id. at 1230.
62. Id. at 1300.
63. Id. at 1301. In The Federalist, Madison had defended the "necessary and
proper clause" (Art. I, § 8, cl. 18), against the charge that the Constitution should have
prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated to the national govern-
ment. If the Constitution had included such a provision, he argued, "it is evident that
the new Congress would be continually exposed... to the alternative of construing
the term 'expressly' with so much rigour as to disarm the government of all real au-
thority whatever, or so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restric-
tion." THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 303 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
64. See CURRIE, supra note 5, at 66-67 (summarizing the debate).
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the constitution provided against the effect of such a disposition, I may be
bold to say, they never would have adopted it ... ,65
D. Assuming State Debts and the Threat of Direct Taxes
A controversial topic in the First Congress was whether the national
government should assume the debts of the states and pay them as debts of
the United States. Many congressmen weighed in on this issue and employed
varying types of original intent arguments.
66
Article 1, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: "Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States." Andrew Moore (Va.) argued that paying the state debts would
require imposing a direct tax on the states.
I remember well, when the constitution was under [consideration]
in the [C]onvention of Virginia. The power of imposing a direct
tax was warmly opposed - The advocates for its adoption stated
... [t]hat occasions might happen in which such a power would
be necessary - That it never would be exercised but in case of
necessity - But we are about to attempt it when no such neces-
sity exists. If the convention had supposed it would have been at-
tempted at so early a day, I think they would have not yet adopted
the constitution.
67
2. 00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention
The number of references to the Constitutional Convention is remark-
able in that it was held behind closed doors.68 Madison's Notes, the only full
record of the Convention, were published posthumously in 1840 and there-
fore were not available to the First Congress.69 Nonetheless, references to the
Convention debates arise in discussions of nine topics: presidential authority
to remove the head of an executive department, imposing a duty on tonnage,
65. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 310.
66. For summaries of the debate, see BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 61-66; CURRIE,
supra note 5, at 76-78; LYNCH, supra note 5, at 71-77. The proposal eventually passed
as the result of a compromise: A reimbursement would be awarded to Virginia and
other states for the part of the debt they had already paid off, and beginning in 1800,
the new capital would be permanently located on the Potomac. LYNCH, supra note 5,
at 76.
67. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 556.
68. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 11, at viii.
69. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, (Max Farrand,
ed., 1911) at xv.
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taxing the slave trade, compensating members of Congress, paying creditors
of the United States, assuming state debts, abolishing slavery, exempting
members of Congress from the state militias, and establishing a national
bank.
2. 01. Follow Policy Sentiments Expressed at the Constitutional Con-
vention.
A. Removing the Head of an Executive Department
When James Madison moved for the establishment of a department of
foreign affairs with a secretary who would be removable by the President, he
triggered a debate over whether the President could remove an executive offi-
cer without the advice and consent of the Senate.
70
Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides: "The President, Vice
President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Article I, section 3, clause 6 gives the Sen-
ate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments." No other provisions deal with
removing federal officers. Article II, section 2, clause 2 states that the Presi-
dent shall "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . .and all
other Officers of the United States."
Speaking in opposition to Madison's proposal, John Page (Va.) argued
that it would give the President far more power than the Constitutional Con-
vention could have intended: "This was never the intention of the constitu-
tion, or [the President] would have had the sole power of appointing. The
framers of the government had confidence in the senate, or they would not
have combined them with the executive in the performance of his duties." 71
Also speaking in opposition to the proposal, Roger Sherman (Conn.), a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, observed "[tlhe convention, who
formed this constitution, thought it would tend to secure the liberties of the
people, if they prohibited the president from the sole appointment of all offi-
cers."
72
Abraham Baldwin (Ga.) disagreed with Sherman and Page. He argued
that the proposal would violate the principle of separation of powers by
"mingling the powers of the president and senate." He noted that at the
Constitutional Convention, such mingling met with opposition: "[s]ome gen-
tlemen opposed it to the last; and finally it was the principal ground on which
70. Id. at 725. For background information on this controversy, see supra notes
46-53 accompanying text.
71. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 957.
72. Id. at 977.
73. Id. at 1003-04.
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they refused to give it their signature and assent. One gentleman74 called it a
monstrous and unnatural connection; and did not hesitate to affirm, it would
bring convulsions to government.""5
B. Imposing a Duty on Tonnage
As one means of raising revenue, Congress considered a tonnage bill
that would impose a duty on each foreign ship entering a United States port
proportional to the ship's carrying capacity.
76
Article I, section 8, clause I of the Constitution states: "Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." Article I,
section 9, clause 6 provides "nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." Relying on his construc-
tion of Article I, section 9, clause 6, Theodorick Bland (Va.) proposed an
amendment that would exempt from the duty vessels bound from one port to
another within the United States. 77 When other delegates disagreed with his
reading of that provision, Bland defended it by relying on an underlying pol-
icy consideration: "[iut was however well known that the Convention, in
framing this article, designed [it] to encourage the coasting trade." 78
C. Taxing the Slave Trade
Article I, section 9, clause 1 of the Constitution states that "a Tax or
duty may be imposed on such Importation [of slaves] not exceeding ten dol-
lars for each Person." At the Congress, Josiah Parker (Va.) moved an amend-
ment that would impose a ten dollar tax on every slave imported into the
United States. 79 He argued that "it was the prevailing expectation that some
measure should be entered into by the general government against the slave
trade-That the constitution itself was calculated upon this idea."80
74. Baldwin evidently referred to Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who had
served with him at the Constitutional Convention. See id. at 1004 n.32.
75. Id. at 1004.
76. BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 31-32 (summarizing the debate on the proposal,
which was defeated in the Senate).
77. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at 410-11 (reporting the debate on Bland's
amendment).
78. Id. at 410.
79. See id. at 642; see also id. at 642-51 (reporting the debate, with Parker even-
tually withdrawing his motion).
80. Id. at 642.
20061
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D. Compensating Members of Congress
The members of the First Congress also debated a proposal to pay
House members five dollars per day and Senators six dollars per day. 81
Article I, § 6, clause 1 of the Constitution states: "The Senators and
Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascer-
tained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States." Arguing in
favor of the different pay scales, James Madison (Va.) claimed implicit sup-
port from the Constitution's drafters:
[H]e observed, that it had been evidently contemplated by the con-
stitution, to distinguish in favor of the senate, that men of abilities
and firm principles, whom the love and custom of a retired life
might render averse to the fatigues of a public one, may be induced
to devote the experience of years, and the acquisitions of study, to
the service of their country. 8
2
E. Paying Creditors of the United States
The First Congress had to pay the debts incurred during the American
Revolution. One particularly troubling issue was how to repay the two types
of creditors: original holders (individuals who loaned money to the United
States and now held public securities), and nonoriginal holders (individuals
who had purchased securities from the original holders at a deep discount.)
Article VI, clause I of the Constitution states: "All Debts contracted and
Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confed-
eration." James Madison proposed paying the nonoriginal holders the highest
market value and then paying the original holders the balance of what the
government owed on the original securities.
83
In opposing Madison's proposal, Fisher Ames (Mass.) argued that the
government should pay the full amount owed to all holders of securities:
If we pursue another kind of policy [not Madison's proposal], such
as the preamble to the constitution declares to be the objects of the
government; this government and this country may expect a more
than Roman fortune. . . . That gentleman [Madison] helped to
81. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1149-56 (reporting the debate on the failed pro-
posal to have discriminatory salaries). Later, the Senate successfully insisted on a
salary differential for 1795; however, in 1796, the salaries were equalized. See
BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 21.
82. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1152.
83. See XII DHFFC. supra note 5, at 294. After a brief debate, Madison's pro-
posal was rejected "by a considerable majority." Id. at 474.
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frame the constitution-I have no doubt it is the better for his emi-
nent abilities-I hope that his love of his own work and his zeal for
the cause which he has so ably supported, will induce him to aban-
don a measure, which tends so fatally to disappoint the first wishes
of his own heart, and the hopes of his country.
2.02. Accept a Proposal that the Constitutional Convention Did Not
Enact, but Seemed to Favor.
A. Assuming State Debts
As previously mentioned, the First Congress debated whether the na-
tional government should assume the state's debts and pay them as debts of
the United States. 85 Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states:
"Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States."
Elbridge Gerry (Mass.), a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, re-
called discussions at the Convention indicating that assumption of the debts
"swas in contemplation from the very commencement of the new govern-
ment."86 According to Gerry, the delegates did not include a provision on this
point for two reasons. First, the proposition they discussed did not go as far as
some delegates wished, and second, other parts of the Constitution authorized
the assumption:
It was opposed, on this ground, that it did not extend to the repay-
ment of that part which the states had sunk, as well as that which
remained unpaid.... [H]ad it not been for this objection, I believe
the very provision, which gentlemen say was never expected,
would have been incorporated into the constitution itself. If I recol-
lect right, it was also contended in convention, that the proposition
would be useless, as congress were authorised, under other parts of
the constitution, to make full provision on this head.87
Roger Sherman (Conn.) agreed with Gerry because, "[i]t was mentioned
in the general convention-but it was not thought necessary or proper to insert
84. Id. at 345.
85. For background information on this issue, see supra note 66
86. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 576.
87. Id. See also XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1719 (making the same argument
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it in the constitution, for Congress would have sufficient power to adopt if
they should judge it expedient."88
Later, James Madison (Va.) relied on his recollection of the Convention
to dispute Gerry's argument:
If as we have been told, the assumption originated in the conven-
tion, why were not words inserted that would have incorporated
and made the state debts part of the debts of the United States? Sir,
if there was a majority who disapproved of the measure, certainly
no argument can be drawn from this source; if there was a majority
who approved of it, but thought it inexpedient to make it a part of
the constitution, they must have been restrained by a fear that it
might produce dissentions and render the success of their plan
doubtful. I do recollect that such a measure was proposed, and, if
my memory does not deceive me, the very gentleman [Gerry]8 9
who now appeals to the constitution in support of his argument,
disrelished the measure at that time, and assigned for a reason, that
it would administer relief perhaps exactly in proportion as the
states had been deficient in making exertions.90
2.03. Reject a Proposal that a Significant Number of Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention Rejected.
A. Abolishing Slavery
In an effort to impede the slave trade, a group of Quakers petitioned
Congress to ban from Pennsylvania ports vessels employed in the interna-
tional slave trade.91 Article I, section 9, clause 1 of the Constitution forbids
Congress from prohibiting "[t]he [mligration and [i]mportation of [slaves]...
prior to the [y]ear one thousand eight hundred and eight.. .. "
In opposing the committing of the petition to a committee, Abraham
Baldwin (Ga.) argued that the Constitution banned the abolition of the slave
trade until 1808. He emphasized that the Southern delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention were "so tender upon this point, that they had well nigh
broken up without coming to any determination," but conceded "from the
88. XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1421.
89. The original newspaper report stated "Sherman" instead of "Gerry," but
corrected the error in a later issue. Id. at 1176 n.55.
90. Id. at 1175-76. At the Constitutional Convention, Gerry had supported as-
sumption of the state debts, but had also pointed out that "as the States had made
different degrees of exertion to sink their respective debts, those who had done most
would be alarmed if they were now to be saddled with a share of the debts of the
states which had done least." MADISON'S NOTEs, supra note 11, at 495.
91. For background information on the debate, see supra note 64
[Vol. 71
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss3/3
ORIGINAL INTENT
extreme desire of preserving the union.' 92 Moreover, "the constitution jeal-
ously guarded what they agreed to." 93 Baldwin stated that an examination of
"the footsteps of that body" would show "the greatest degree of caution used
to imprint them, so as not to be easily eradicated; but from the moment we go
to jostle on that ground... I fear we shall feel it tremble under our feet." 94
2.04. Reject a Proposal that the Constitutional Convention
Apparently Rejected
A. Assuming State Debts95
In the debate over whether the national government should assume the
debts of the states and then pay them as debts of the United States,96 James
Jackson (Ga.) cited Elbridge Gerry's references to discussions at the Consti-
tutional Convention and interpreted them as confirming that the state debts
"were not respected as the debts of the Union by the convention." 97 He ar-
gued: "[t]he convention met, and the constitution was formed, for the restora-
tion of public credit, and if the state debts were a part of the debt of the Un-
ion, provision would have been made for them ... " Thus, "if the convention
had no power to insert them in the constitution, whence all our powers are
derived; neither, Sir, have we the power under that constitution to provide for
the payment of them."
98
Michael Jenifer Stone (Md.) also argued that the Framers did not intend
that the national government should assume state debts:
Was it the intention of the framers of this government, and does
their work contain the idea, that the union should assume the debts
of the particular states? Will it give the general government a
greater degree of power? I apprehend that it may: If, then, it be a
power not contemplated in the constitution, is it not an assumed
power? This deduction is clear to my mind.99
Although Andrew Moore (Va.) supported a compromise proposal, he
found no constitutional barrier to having the national government assume
92. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 308.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: "Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
96. For background information on this debate, see supra note 66.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
98. XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1697.
99. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 542.
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state debt: "I think the framers of the constitution contemplated the payment
of the debts of the United States only. But from our assuming the state debts,
they become the debts of the United States, and we are to pay them."'
'l
B. Exempting Members of Congress from the State Militias
While debating a bill to regulate the state militias, the House considered
a provision to exempt from service officers of the national government. Arti-
cle I, section 6, clause I of the Constitution states:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for
their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treas-
ury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or De-
bate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
Place.
William Giles (Va.) objected to exempting members of Congress. He
quoted Article I, section 6, clause I of the Constitution and declared that it set
out all the privileges to which members of Congress were entitled: "if the
convention took up this subject (as it is plain from the foregoing clause that
they did) it is reasonable to presume, that they made a full declaration of all
our privileges; and it is improper to suppose, that we are possessed of similar
powers with the convention, and able to extend our own privileges."'10 1
C. Removing the Head of an Executive Department
As previously discussed, a major controversy in the First Congress was
whether the President had the power to remove a federal officer without the
advice and consent of the Senate.' 0 2 Article II, section 4 of the Constitution
provides: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Article I, section
3, clause 6 gives the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments." No
other provisions deal with removing federal officers. Article II, section 2,
clause 2 states that the President shall "nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls... and all other Officers of the United States."
100. Id. at 536.
101. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 133.
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Arguing against the President's removal power, Alexander White (VA)
denied that there was a defect or "omitted case" in the Constitution, because it
failed to provide for the removal of officers. Therefore, he argued, Congress
does not have the power to cure the defect:
For the constitution having directed by whom the officers shall be
appointed, it does direct also by whom they shall be removed....
Sir, this must have been in the contemplation of the gentlemen who
formed the constitution. Is it probable that they never thought
about the manner in which an officer should be displaced?'
0 3
Abraham Baldwin (Ga.) disagreed with White and argued, "[i]f this had
been the sense of the Convention who framed the Constitution, the clause 'to
be removed in like manner' would have been added.1 4 He continued, "no
such clause is in the constitution; and therefore I should conclude, that the
convention did not chuse [the Senate] should have the power." 105
Roger Sherman (Conn.) also argued against White's position. Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution provides: "Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." If the
President is the head of a department, Sherman argued, then Congress can
authorize him to appoint cabinet heads and remove them.'0 6 White countered
by saying he would not classify the President as the head of a department:
"[t]he gentlemen who formed the constitution would not, it seems, give to the
President at all events the power of appointing these inferior officers to which
that of removal is attached."'
0 7
D. Establishing a National Bank
In the ongoing debate about establishing a national bank,0 8 James
Madison disagreed that the necessary and proper clause gave Congress the
appropriate authority.1°9 When Congress considered a proposal to establish a
national bank, James Madison (Va.), who opposed the measure, questioned
Congress's authority to pass it: "[h]is impression might perhaps be the
103. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 943.
104. Id. at 995.
105. Id. at 1005.
106. Id. at 917.
107. Id. at 944; see also id. at 956 (reporting the same speech).
108. For background information, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
109. Article I, section 8, clause 18 authorizes Congress to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."
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stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of incor-
poration had been proposed in the general convention and been rejected."'" 0
3.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Evils that the Constitutional
Convention Sought to Avoid
In determining how to implement two provisions of the Constitution,
some delegates focused on problems that the Convention sought to remedy:
establishing a national judicial system and naturalizing citizens.
A. Establishing a System of Lower Federal Courts
The structure of the federal court system, particularly the creation of in-
ferior courts, was the subject of debate in the First Congress. Article III, sec-
tion 1 of the Constitution provides: "The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish." In opposing a proposal to
have the state courts serve as the inferior federal courts,"1' James Madison
(Va.) recalled that under the Articles of Confederation, "the judicial was so
confined as to be of little consequence," and therefore, under the Constitution,
"a regular system is provided" in order to make the judiciary an effective
branch of government. Madison noted that because state courts and their jus-
tices are so dependent on the state legislatures, "permitting them to make the
federal laws dependent on them would throw us back into all the embarrass-
ments which characterized our former situation."
112
Michael Jenifer Stone (Md.) argued that a system of inferior courts was
not necessary. "It appears to me that the present government originated in
necessity, and it ought not to be carried further than necessity will justify.'' 13
According to Stone, "the scheme of the present government was considered
by those who framed it, as dangerous to the liberties of America" 14 because
of the tensions it created between the national government and the state gov-
ernments:
[The Framers] supposed that [national government] had a natural
tendency to destroy the state governments, or on the other hand,
they supposed that the state governments had a tendency to abridge
110. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 368. See supra note 15 (noting the deviation
from Madison's normal refusal to rely on the Constitutional Convention in matters of
construction).
11. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 47-49 (summarizing the debate over the
Judiciary Act).
112. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1359.
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the powers of the general government, therefore it was necessary to
guard against either taking place, and this was to be done properly
by establishing a judiciary for the United States." 5
Stone thus saw the necessity of a federal supreme court, but did not find it
necessary to establish a system of inferior federal courts when the state courts
could serve their function.16
B. Naturalizing Citizens
At the time of the First Congress, there was no uniform rule for citizen-
ship. Instead, citizenship requirements varied from state to state. The First
Congress debated the parameters of a uniform citizenship rule. Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 4 authorizes Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization." In February 1790, the House considered a naturalization bill that
read:
that all free white persons, who have, or shall migrate into the
United States, and shall give satisfactory proof, before a magis-
trate, by oath, that they intend to reside therein, and shall take an
oath of allegiance, and shall have resided within the United States,
and shall have resided within the United States for one whole year,
shall be entitled to all the rights of citizenship, except being capa-
ble of holding an office under the state or general government,
which capacity they are to acquire after a residence of two years or
more.
17
Because the length of residency required to achieve citizenship varied
from state to state, Thomas Hartley (Pa.) noted: "[tihe terms of citizenship
were made too cheap in some parts of the union; now, to say, that a man shall
be admitted to all the privileges of a citizen, without any residence at all, is
what can hardly be expected."' 18 Roger Sherman (Conn.) argued that the in-
terests of the states and the general government ought to be consulted:
He presumed it was intended by the convention, who framed the
constitution, that the congress should have the power of naturaliza-
tion, in order to prevent particular states receiving citizens, and
115. Id.
116. Id.
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forcing them upon others, who would not have received them...
upon easier terms than those pursued by the several states."19
4. 00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation
Delegates to the First Congress made positive references to provisions
of the Articles of Confederation and legislative practices under it with respect
to only two issues: defining the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury and
assuming state debts. Given the dissatisfaction with the Articles, the paucity
of references is not surprising.
4. 01. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Successful Practices under
the Articles of Confederation
A. Defining the Duties of the Secretary of the Treasury
In a bill to establish the Department of the Treasury, one clause obligated
the Secretary of the Treasury "to digest and report plans for the improvement
and management of the revenue, and the support of the public credit."' 20 Article
I, section 7, clause 1 of the Constitution specifies: "All Bills for raising Reve-
nue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . ." Some members
claimed that the proposed clause empowered the Secretary to originate money
bills, contrary to Article I, section 7, clause 1. Thomas Tucker (S.C.) argued:
If we authorise him to prepare and report plans, it will create an in-
ference of the executive with the legislative powers, it will abridge
the particular privilege of this house, for the constitution expressly
declares, that all bills for raising revenue, shall originate in the
house of representatives; how can the business originate in this
house if we have it reported to us by the minister of finance .... 121
In support of the bill, James Madison (Va.) cited the actions of the Con-
gress under the Articles of Confederation to demonstrate that it created no
danger: "[tihese are precisely the words used by the former congress, on two
occasions, one in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which estab-
lished the revenue board, the same power was also annexed to the office of
119. Id. at 147.
120. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1059. See id. at 1059-76 (reporting the debate on
this issue).
121. Id. at 1059. The controversy was resolved with a successful vote on Thomas
Fizsimons's motion to delete the word "report" and replace it with the word "pre-
pare." Id. at 1072, 1076.
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superintendent of finance, but I never yet heard that any inconvenience of
danger was experienced from the regulation .... ,,122
B. Assuming State Debts
When debating whether the national government should assume the
debts of the states,123 James Jackson (Ga.), speaking in opposition, looked to
a precedent under the Articles of Confederation Congress.'24 Some states had
voluntarily contributed impost duties - duties they imposed on imports - to
the Confederation government. Jackson argued that the duties did not corre-
spond to a state's population, but to the economy of the state.1 25 Elbridge
Gerry (Mass.), who supported assumption, disagreed with Jackson's asser-
tion.
The gentleman [James Jackson (Ga.)] says, when Congress in
1783, required an impost, it was understood that every state should
pay her own debts, that Georgia had done what it could, and ought
not to pay an iota more. 126 This is a new doctrine, and is contrary
to the express stipulations of all the requisitions of Congress [re-
quests for financing from the states], of which I think are between
twenty and thirty. 
2 7
4.02. In Interpreting the Constitution in Light of Practices under
the Articles of Confederation, Consider all the Factors
that had been Present
A. Defining the Duties of the Secretary of the Treasury
Article I, section 7, clause I of the Constitution specifies: "All Bills for
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives .... " In a bill
to establish the Department of the Treasury, one clause obligated the Secre-
122. Id. at 1072.
123. For background information on this issue, see supra note 65.
124. Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: "Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
125. See XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1701. Jackson was responding to an argu-
ment by Roger Sherman that, according to a 1781 committee report, states had con-
tributed in proportion to the number of their inhabitants. Id. at 1421. Jackson was
arguing that states that import more pay proportionately more, and that their reliance
on imports is not proportionate to their respective populations. Id. at 1701.
126. Jackson had stated only that Georgia had contributed heavily to the public
treasury, because "Georgia manufactures nothing, and imports everything." Id. at
1701.
127. Id. at 1720.
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tary of the Treasury "to digest and report plans for the improvement and
management of the revenue, and the support of the public credit." Some
members argued that this clause empowered the Secretary to originate money
bills, contrary to Article I, section 7, clause 1.128
James Madison (Va.) argued that, under the Articles of Confederation, a
revenue board had enjoyed these powers and had worked successfilly.129
John Page (Va.) noted, however, that the prior Congress had a check upon
revenue board misconduct: "the late congress were obliged to submit their
plans to the state legislatures; consequently there was less danger of undue
influence."130
5.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Publications Widely Circu-
lated during the Constitution's Ratification
A. Removing the Head of an Executive Department'
3
'
As previously discussed, a major controversy in the First Congress was
whether the President had the power to remove a federal officer.13 2 Opposing
the proposition to give removal power to the President,", William L. Smith
(S.C.) noted that he had "examined the subject maturely" and had consulted
"sensible writers on the subject of the constitution, who had laid it down, that
the senate ought to be consulted in the removal as well as in the appointment
of officers."'133 Smith claimed to find support for his position in The Federal-
ist: "[o]ne, in particular, under the signature of PUBLIUS, who had commented
with extensive learning, and with the most profound sagacity, had expressed
fully that opinion."
'134
128. For background on this debate, see supra notes 120-22 and accompanying
text.
129. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1072.
130. Id. at 1073.
131. Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides: "The President, Vice Presi-
dent and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors." Article I, section 3, clause 6 gives the Senate "the sole Power to try all
Impeachments." No other provisions deal with removing federal officers. Article II,
section 2, clause 2 states that the President shall "nominate, and by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls. . and all other Officers of the United States."
132. For background on this controversy, see supra note 46-53, 72.
133. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 843.
134. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 843; see also id. at 853, 861 (reporting the same
statement in The Gazette of the United States and The Congressional Register, respec-
tively); id. at 935 (reiterating his reliance on The Federalist). Smith was referring to
THE FEDERALIST No. 77. See id. at 843 n.7. "The consent of 'the Senate' would be
necessary to displace as well as appoint.... Those who can best estimate the value of
[Vol. 71
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Abraham Baldwin (Ga.) argued that the proposal would violate the prin-
ciple of separation of powers by "mingling the powers of the president and
senate." 135 He referred to one delegate to the Convention, presumably El-
bridge Gerry (Mass.)13 6 who "called it a monstrous and unnatural connection;
and did not hesitate to affirm, it would bring convulsions to
government."13 7 Gerry continued to raise concerns about the lack of separation
of powers during the ratification debates, particularly in his letter to the
Massachusetts legislature in October 1787.138 Moreover, Baldwin noted:
"[t]his objection was not confined to the walls of the convention; it has been
the subject of newspaper declamation, and perhaps justly so."1 39
James Jackson (Ga.) also spoke against the proposal. As for the relation-
ship between the executive and the legislative, he found them intertwined and
considered the senate as part of the executive, and the President as part of the
legislative. He appealed to the work called the FEDERALIST, as confirmation
of this."'40 He also encouraged his colleagues to read the speeches that James
Wilson delivered at Pennsylvania's ratifying convention declaring that "the
senate was constituted a check upon the president."' 14 1 According to Jackson:
"[t]his sentiment is confirmed by other writers of reputation."' 142
B. Establishing a National Bank
Article I, section 8, clause 18 authorizes congress to "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." When Con-
gress considered a proposal to establish a national bank, 143 James Jackson
(Ga.) argued that the proposal contravened the spirit of the Constitution by
creating "a monopoly of a very extraordinary nature .... He then read sev-
a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the
official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body
[the Senate] ...." TiE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 62, at
515-16. Smith probably knew the identities of PUBLIUS. See RAKOVE, supra note 15,
at 350. However, he may not have known which author wrote which paper. See XIV
DHFFC at 421 n.20.
135. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1003-04.
136. See id. at 1004 n.32.
137. Id. at 1004.
138. See id. at 1004 n.32.
139. Id. at 1004.
140. Id. at 948.; see also id. at 970 (reporting the same speech in The Congres-
sional Register).
141. Id. at 1002-03. For more information on Jackson's speech on this point, see
supra text accompanying note 50.
142. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1003.
143. For background information on this issue, see supra notes 53-54.
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eral passages from The Federalist, which he said were directly contrary to the
assumption of power proposed by the bill."'144 However, those passages ar-
gued that the necessary and proper clause should be read expansively.
45
Shortly thereafter, he again read from The Federalist "to shew that the as-
sumption of this power, agreeable to the sentiments of the author of those
pieces, would be contrary to the constitution, the powers of Congress being
particularly defined."'146 Elias Boudinot (N.J.) quoted from the same issue of
The Federalist as well as from The Federalist No. 23 to argue that the clause




It has been argued that for the Founders, "original intent" referred only
to what could be gleaned from the Constitution's language and the use of
structural means of interpretation but not from the personal intentions of the
Founders. The present study opens this argument to reevaluation. In the
Founding Era, the debates over the Constitution's scope permitted a broader
array of evidence, including the purposes, expectations and intentions of the
individuals and gatherings that created the document. At the same time, this
study shows that the compromises and decisions of the First Congress re-
sulted from both interest politics and a variety of arguments, including
originalist arguments, which were sometimes raised on opposite sides of the
same issue. This process has always been typical of legislatures. 4s
144. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 364. See id. at 376 (reading from The Federal-
ist "to shew that the assumption of this power, agreeable to the sentiments of the au-
thor of those pieces [presumably Hamilton, who advocated a national bank], would be
contrary to the constitution, the powers of Congress being particularly defined.").
145. Elias Boudinot (N.J.) disclosed that Jackson had read from The Federalist
No. 44 and then read from it to document the argument that the necessary and proper
clause had to be read broadly, because it was impractical to include in the Constitu-
tion a positive enumeration of all national governmental powers. See id. at 439 (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON), supra note 62, at 304). Based
on his remarks, Boudinot thought the author of the paper was Madison, who opposed
a national bank, while the author was Hamilton who advocated it. See XIV DHFFC,
supra note 5, at 439. At this time, authorship of the individual papers was not gener-
ally known. See id. at 421 n.20.
146. Id. at 376. I would surmise that Jackson realized the error in his first interpre-
tation of Federalist No. 44 and was now correcting himself. Apparently, Jackson
correctly believed that the author of the paper was Hamilton.
147. Id. at 439. The Federalist No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) argues that the na-
tional government should have unlimited power in matters of common defense.
148. "While rational argument remains an important currency [in legislative deci-
sion making], the ability to negotiate and moderate views in the context of such nego-
tiation is equally important." ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 67 (1997). During his
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For example, in a speech opposing the establishment of a national bank,
Madison allowed the use of "contemporary expositions given to the constitu-
tion."'' 49 Under this canon of construction, he introduced evidence on the sen-
timents expressed in various state ratifying conventions that the necessary and
proper clause should be narrowly construed.1 50 Thus, he relied on legislative
history - not contemporary expositions of meaning - to argue that Congress
lacked the authority to establish the bank. In doing so, Madison deviated from
the purely textual British tradition that did not employ legislative history to
construe statutory text.15' Despite this deviation, Madison apparently ex-
pected his argument to be persuasive to his colleagues. His choice of argu-
ment suggests that when it came to rules of construction, the Founders were
not purely textualists, but were often pragmatic politicians.
The originalist arguments, moreover, have an air of practicality to them.
Minimal reflection on the categories of argument and the arguments them-
selves confirms that they are not highly rarified. Putting aside the burden of
dealing with the eighteenth-century rhetorical style of public debate, the
modem reader can easily understand the concerns of the debaters. Perhaps the
most theoretical issue that arises is separation of powers. Yet, in discussing
proposals dealing with the allocation of power and the potential blending of
powers between the executive and the legislative branches, the reader under-
stands that the issue is not about a blind aspiration to a rigid separation of
powers. Rather it is about deciding how best to make decisions without allo-
cating too much power to one branch and thus inviting despotic rule and cor-
ruption.
The originalist arguments were one type of persuasive argument among
many. They arose in debates on serious topics and seemed to play the greatest
role in debates on the most controversial issues. Primarily, these were the
debates over the President's removal power and assumption of the states'
debts, some of which divided the country according to the particular interests
of the various states.
Debates with regional implications included those over abolishing slav-
ery, taxing the slave trade, assuming the states' debts, which would disfavor
states that had worked to pay off much of their financial obligations, and es-
tablishing a uniform naturalization law, which would disfavor states with
liberal naturalization laws.
An examination of the arguments, the presenters, and the context sug-
gests that the debates were generated by both matters of constitutional policy
and political pragmatism. For example, although Madison had argued in The
long career in public service, Judge Mikva served as a member of the Illinois House
of Representatives and the United States House of Representatives. Professor Lane
also has a long history of public service. Id. at xxiii.
149. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 374.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (arguing that the Constitution did
not authorize establishing a national bank).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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Federalist for a broad reading of the necessary and proper clause, he opposed
reading the clause broadly enough to authorize a national bank. Madison's
position may have rested merely on political theory and the legislative history
of the state ratifying conventions. However, his position and arguments may
also have found roots in the belief that such a bank would favor the Northern
states over the Southern states, and could have stemmed from his desire to
win reelection when he had barely won his seat the first time.
A negotiated settlement of an issue can overcome constitutional scru-
ples. For example, despite the many constitutional and originalist arguments
on the authority of Congress to assume the debts of the states, the Congres-
sional parties acquiesced to assumption when offered a compromise in which
states like Virginia which, for example, would receive some reimbursement
for the debt it had already paid off and gain the location of the permanent
capital of the country along the Potomac.'
52
In academic discussions about originalism, scholars sometimes make an
effort to identify consistent theories of constitutional construction employed
by the Founders. According to one theory, they relied solely on the text of the
document and ignored its legislative history.'5 In contrast, others would ar-
gue that consulting original intent was always a permissible tool of construc-
tion. 5 4 And puzzlement is inevitable when the Founders occasionally fail to
conform with the chosen theory. It is quite likely that the Founders were both
intellectuals and pragmatic politicians who were not concerned with hewing a
perfectly consistent line. And, as one scholar has noted, "history is indetermi-
nate."
155
152. See supra note 66.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
154. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 4.
155. Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 437, 441 (1996).
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